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TAXATION
Craig D. Bell*
This article reviews significant recent developments in the
law affecting Virginia taxation. Each section covers recent judi-
cial decisions and legislative changes over the past year. The.
overall purpose of this article is to provide Virginia tax and
general practitioners with a concise overview of the recent de-
velopments in Virginia taxation most likely to have an impact
on Virginia practitioners. This article, however, will not discuss
many of the numerous legislative technical changes to the State
Taxation Code of Title 58.1.
PART ONE: TAXES ADMINISTERED BY THE VIRGINIA
DEPARTMENT OF TAXATION
I. INCOME TAX
A. Recent Judicial Decisions
1. Corporate Income-Nexus
In Virginia Department of Taxation v. National Private Truck
Council,' the Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed the Alexan-
dria Circuit Court decision granting summary judgment to the
National Private Truck Council on its claim that a Virginia
* Chairman and Principal, Eure, Kincer & Bell, P.C., Richmond, Virginia. B.S.,
(Management, magna cum laude, with honors in Transportation and Distribution
Management), 1979, Syracuse University; MBA, 1980, Syracuse University; J.D., 1983,
State University of New York at Buffalo School of Law; LL.M. (Taxation), 1986, Mar-
shall-Wythe School of Law, College of William and Mary. Mr. Bell concentrates his
practice on state and local taxation, civil and criminal tax litigation, general tax
planning, and business law. He is also an adjunct professor of State and Local Tax
for the Virginia Commonwealth University's Masters in Taxation program. Mr. Bell
serves on the Board of Governors and as chair of the Virginia State Bar's Section on
Taxation.
1. 253 Va. 74, 480 S.E.2d 500 (1997).
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corporate income tax regulation, Section 630-3-401(G),2 violates
15 U.S.C. § 381,' as well as the Due Process 4 and Commerce
Clauses5 of the United States Constitution.6 These two provi-
sions of the Constitution require that, before a state may tax a
person, property or transaction, there must be some mininium
"nexus" between the state and the person, property or transac-
tion sought to be taxed.7
In 1959, Congress enacted Public Law 86-272,' to implement
and amplify the constitutional protection to businesses operat-
ing in interstate commerce. This statute provides, in pertinent
part:
No State ... shall have power to impose ... a net income
tax on the income derived within such State by any person
from interstate commerce if the only business activities
within such State by or on behalf of such person...
are ... :
(1) the solicitation of orders by such person ... in such
State for sales of tangible personal property, which orders
are sent outside the State for approval or rejection, and, if
approved, are filled by shipment or delivery from a point
outside the State.9
At trial, the National Private Truck Council, Inc.-a national
trade association consisting of over 1,000 companies that manu-
facture, distribute and transport their products in their own
trucks-directly challenged the Virginia Department of
Taxation's regulation which only extended the immunity from
state income taxation afforded under 15 U.S.C. § 381 to those
instances in which the shipment or delivery of goods was ac-
complished by common carrier."' The petitioners argued, and
2. 23 VA. ADmiN. CODE 10-120-90(G) (1997) (formerly VRR 630-3-401(G)).
3. 15 U.S.C. § 381 (1994).
4. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
5. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
6. See National Private Truck Council, 253 Va. at 77, 480 S.E.2d at 502.
7. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 & amend. XIV, § 1.
8. Pub. L. No. 86-272, 73 Stat. 555, (1959) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §
381 (1994)).
9. 15 U.S.C. § 381(a) (1994).
10. See 23 VA. ADMIN. CODE 10-120-90(GX1)(1997) (formerly VRR 630-3-401(GX1)).
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the circuit court agreed, that the Department's regulation and
position were at odds with the plain language of 15 U.S.C. §
381 and its legislative history."
The supreme court held that the Virginia regulation limiting
the State corporate income tax immunity to companies shipping
or delivering goods to Virginia customers by common carrier,
while taxing those companies using their own truck fleets, vio-
lated 15 U.S.C. § 381 because it limited conditions under which
out-of-state sellers were entitled to tax immunity.' In reaching
this result, the supreme court stated that:
Section 381, by plain and clear language, extends immunity
to a particular income-generating transaction. This transac-
tion consists of soliciting orders, approving the orders, and
shipping or delivering the goods ordered. To limit the tax
immunity granted by § 381 to the activity of solicitation
only, as the Department suggests, renders the protection in-
tended by that section meaningless. Potentially taxable
income is not generated within the taxing state until there
has been a successful "shipment or delivery" of goods. Ex-
empting merely "solicitation" is no exemption at all.13
In reaching its decision, the supreme court looked carefully at
the wording of 15 U.S.C. § 381 and noted that Congress did not
identify any manner of delivery necessary to qualify for the
immunity. 4 The section did not specify common carrier, con-
tract or private carrier, or any other particular method of deliv-
ery. The supreme court stated that "[i]n the absence of a quali-
fication in the federal statute, the Department may not add
conditions to, or otherwise limit, the protection afforded by 15
U.S.C. § 381.-15
11. See National Private Truck Council v. Virginia Dep't of Taxation, 37 Va. Cir.
334 (Alexandria City 1996).
12. See Virginia Dep't of Taxation v. National Private Truck Council, 253 Va. 74,
77, 480 S.E.2d 500, 502 (1997).
13. Id. at 76, 480 S.E.2d at 502.
14. See id. at 77, 480 S.E.2d at 502.
15. Id.
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In McWane, Inc. v. Virginia Department of Taxation,6 the
Richmond Circuit Court had the opportunity to apply the activi-
ties performed by a valve and hydrant salesman to the pro-
tected solicitation activities of 15 U.S.C. § 381. In McWane, the
circuit court looked carefully at the activities of a valve and
hydrant salesman who had assisted Virginia customers in his
sales territory on five or six occasions to repair fire hydrants.
Specifically, the salesman would remove a few bolts and replace
a gasket in a fire hydrant. 7 The issue before the court was
whether the repair of five or six hydrants went beyond the
solicitation of sales or was an activity ancillary to such solicita-
tion, or, if not, whether such activity was de minimis. 8 The
Richmond Circuit Court held that the salesman's repair activi-
ties were not the solicitation of sales or an activity which was
ancillary to the solicitation of sales. 9 In its conclusion, the
circuit court cited the United States Supreme Court decision in
Wisconsin Department of Revenue v. Wrigley Co.,' in which
the Supreme Court stated that "[rlepair and servicing may help
to increase purchases; but it is not ancillary to requesting pur-
chases, and cannot be converted into 'solicitation' by merely
being assigned to salesmen."1
Despite this finding, the circuit court held that the repair
activities performed by McWane's salesman were de minimis . '
The court noted that McWane's total repair activity in Virginia
consisted of the removal of "a few bolts" to replace a fire hy-
drant gasket five or six times a year.' The court stated that
McWane's repair activity was nothing more than an accommo-
dation to its customers and that such activity failed to establish
a "nontrivial additional connection with Virginia."' As a result
of this holding, all of McWane's activities in Virginia were pro-
16. No. LB-1623-1 (Richmond City Cir. Ct. May 23, 1997).
17. See id.
18. See id. at 3.
19. See id.
20. 505 U.S. 214 (1992).
21. Id. at 229 (emphasis added).
22. See McWayne, No. LB-1623-1 at 3.
23. See id. at 4.
24. Id. at 5.
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tected by 15 U.S.C. § 381, and the Virginia Department of
Taxation's assessment and the taxes at issue were set aside.'
2. Income Tax Credits
In Mathy v. Virginia Department of Taxation,26 the Supreme
Court of Virginia held that two Virginia taxpayers were not
entitled to a credit under Virginia Code section 58.1-332(A) for
taxes paid to the District of Columbia on income received from
a partnership conducted in the District of Columbia."
Mr. and Mrs. Mathy were residents of northern Virginia;
however, Mr. Mathy was a general partner in a District of
Columbia general partnership.' The partnership's sole source
of income during the relevant tax years was rental income
earned from the operation of an office building in the District of
Columbia.' The partnership filed District of Columbia tax re-
turns for 1991, 1992, and 1993, and paid the taxes due on
income received from the commercial office rental pursuant to
D.C. Code Ann. No. 47-1808.1 to -1808.6.3o This portion of the
District of Columbia Code involves the appropriate taxes on
unincorporated businesses. Specifically, the tax applies to the
"privilege of carrying on or engaging in any trade or business
within the District and of receiving income from sources within
the District."3 ' The tax is levied at a rate of 10% upon the tax-
able income of every unincorporated business, plus a surtax of
between 2.5% and 5% of taxes dueY.3 The taxes may be as-
sessed in the name of the unincorporated business but are
payable by the persons conducting the business.' As a general
partner, Mr. Mathy was personally liable for the payment of
these unincorporated business taxes.'
25. See id.
26. 253 Va. 356, 483 S.E.2d 802 (1997).
27. See id. at 362, 483 S.E.2d at 805.
28. See id. at 358, 483 S.E.2d at 802.
29. See id.
30. See id.
31. D.C. CODE ANN. § 47-1808.3 (1997).
32. See id. At the time of Mathy, the statute required the tax to be 10%. After
December 31, 1994, the tax changed to its current rate of 9.5%.
33. See D.C. CODE ANN. § 47-1808.5 (1997).
34. See § 41-114(2).
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In filing their Virginia income tax returns for tax years 1991
through 1993, the Mathys reported Mr. Mathy's share of the
net income from the D.C. partnership. When the Mathys filed
those returns, they did not claim an out-of-state tax credit
against their Virginia taxes for the taxes paid pursuant to the
District of Columbia unincorporated business tax.35
In 1994, the Mathys filed amended Virginia income tax re-
turns for the previous three tax years, claiming an out-of-state
tax credit pursuant to Virginia Code section 58.1-332(A) and
requesting refunds from Virginia for each of the three tax years
at issue.36 This provision of the Virginia Tax Code provides a
tax credit to Virginia residents who become liable in another
state for income tax on any earned or business income derived
from sources outside of Virginia and subjected to taxation.'
The tax credit is equal to the amount of the tax actually paid
to the other state.38 The statute excludes franchise taxes, li-
cense taxes, excise taxes, unincorporated business taxes, occupa-
tion taxes or other similar forms of taxes.39
After the Virginia Department of Taxation determined that
the Mathys were not entitled to the tax credit under section
58.1-332(A), the Mathys initiated a lawsuit which resulted in
the grant of a motion for summary judgment to the Department
of Taxation.' The trial court held that the Mathys were not
entitled to a credit against their Virginia taxes for payment of
the District of Columbia's unincorporated business tax.4 '
The trial court found that the District of Columbia unincorpo-
rated business tax was not an income tax subject to the credit
available under section 58.1-332(A), but instead was an unincor-
porated business tax on income imposed for the privilege of
conducting business in the District.42 On appeal, the taxpayers
argued that the trial court's ruling conflicted with prior case
law from both the Supreme Court of Virginia and the District
35. See Mathy, 253 Va. at 358-59, 483 S.E.2d at 803.
36. See id. at 359, 483 S.E.2d at 803.
37. See VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-332(A) (Repl. Vol. 1997).
38. See id.
39. See id.
40. See Mathy, 253 Va. at 360, 483 S.E.2d at 804.
41. See id. at 359, 483 S.E.2d at 803.
42. See id.
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of Columbia Court of Appeals, citing King v. Forst,' and Bish-
op v. District of Columbia." The Mathys argued these two cas-
es held that the unincorporated business tax was an income tax
and not an unincorporated business tax, franchise tax or privi-
lege tax."
The Department of Taxation argued to the Supreme Court of
Virginia that the District of Columbia tax was, in fact, an unin-
corporated business tax within the meaning of Virginia Code
section 58.1-332(A), and was characterized as such by the Dis-
trict of Columbia tax statute.' The supreme court held that
its prior decision in King v. Forst was dispositive of the issue
on whether the unincorporated business tax of the District of
Columbia was an income tax.4' In King, the supreme court
held that the District of Columbia's unincorporated business tax
was an income tax for purposes of the section 58.1-332(A) tax
credit.' The supreme court in King concluded that a Virginia
taxpayer, a sole proprietor of an unincorporated business locat-
ed in the District, was entitled to the Virginia tax credit for
payment of the District of Columbia unincorporated business
tax.49 As a result of the King decision, the Mathys would be
entitled to a credit under Virginia Code section 58.1-332(A)
unless the tax "would be illegal and unauthorized under such
other state's controlling or enabling legislation."50
The supreme court next had to determine whether the Dis-
trict of Columbia's unincorporated business tax would be illegal
and unauthorized under the District of Columbia's Home Rule
Act.51 In the Home Rule Act, the United States Congress gave
the District of Columbia Council legislative authority over most
matters involving the District. 2 However, the supreme court
noted that the Home Rule Act "expressly prohibits the Council
43. 239 Va. 557, 391 S.E.2d 60 (1990).
44. 401 A.2d 955 (D.C. 1979), affld en banc, 411 A.2d 997 (1980).
45. See Mathy, 253 Va. at 360, 483 S.E.2d at 803.
46. See id&
47. See id. at 361, 483 S.E.2d at 804.
48. See King, 239 Va. at 561, 391 S.E.2d at 62.
49. See Mathy, 253 Va. at 360-61, 483 S.E.2d at 804.
50. Id. at 361, 483 S.E.2d at 804.
51. See id.
52. See D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 1-201(a), 1-204 to 1-229 (Repl. Vol. 1992 & Cum.
Supp. 1996).
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from imposing a 'commuter tax,' defined as 'any tax on the
whole or any portion of the personal income ... of any individ-
ual not a resident of the District."
53
The Department of Taxation argued that if the District of
Columbia unincorporated business tax was an income tax, it
violated the Home Rule Act by taxing the personal income of a
non-resident of the District of Columbia." The Mathys argued
that the tax did not violate the Home Rule Act since (1) the tax
was imposed on their rental business income, not on their per-
sonal income, and (2) the Home Rule Act only protected person-
al income.55 The supreme court disagreed with both arguments
made by the taxpayers. It noted that the Bishop decision of the
District of Columbia Court of Appeals specifically concluded
that the unincorporated business tax was levied on personal
income, thus constituting, "in reality, a tax on associates or
partners who run the business."'56
The supreme court concluded that the trial court reached the
correct result but for the wrong reason. The correct reasoning,
according to the supreme court, was that the plain language of
the second paragraph of Virginia Code section 58.1-332(A) ex-
cluded the unincorporated business tax as a tax which is eligi-
ble for the tax credit.57
3. Virginia Additions and Subtractions-Individuals
In a unanimous decision, the Supreme Court of Virginia
reversed a ruling by the Richmond Circuit Court and held that
a state income tax return must mirror that of a federal income
tax return in reporting unearned income of children under age
fourteen.58 The circuit court decision held that a parent's elec-
tion to include his or her children's unearned income with the
53. Mathy, 253 Va. at 361, 483 S.E.2d at 804 (quoting D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-
233(aX5)).
54. See id. at 362, 483 S.E.2d at 804-05.
55. See id.
56. Id. (quoting Bishop v. District of Columbia, 401 A.2d 955, 961 n.181 (D.C.
1979)).
57. See id.
58. See Virginia Dep't of Taxation v. Davenport, 253 Va. 228, 482 S.E.2d 808
(1997).
parent's gross income from federal income tax returns did not
make such income a part of the parent's Virginia taxable
income. 9
For tax years 1992, 1993 and 1994, the Davenports' five
minor children had unearned income which the Davenports
elected to include in their gross income when they filed a joint
federal tax return, pursuant to section 1(g) of the Internal Rev-
enue Code of 1 9 8 6 .'° This provision,
Ucommonly known as the 'Kiddie Tax,' generally provides
that the unearned income of a child under the age of 14
years is taxed by the federal government at the tax rate
applicable to the child's parents if the parents file jointly,
at the rate of the parent with the greater income if the
parents file separately, or at the rate of the custodial par-
ent if the parents are not married to each other."'
When the Davenports prepared their Virginia income tax
returns for those years, they subtracted their children's un-
earned income from their federal adjusted gross income as re-
ported on their federal tax returns. 2 Virginia issued a notice
of assessment to the Davenports for their 1992 Virginia income
tax return. The Davenports paid the additional tax assessment
under protest and filed an application for correction of errone-
ous or improper assessments of state income taxes in Richmond
Circuit Court, arguing they were entitled to subtract their
children's unearned income from their federal adjusted gross
income."
At trial, the Virginia Department of Taxation argued that
Virginia Code section 58.1-322' defined "Virginia taxable in-
come" and set out a rather complete list of items "which must
be added to, or which may be deducted from, a taxpayer's feder-
al adjusted gross income in order to arrive at the taxpayer's
59. See Davenport v. Virginia Dep't of Taxation, 38 Va. Cir. 421 (Richmond City
1996). For a more thorough discussion of the Richmond Circuit Court decision, see
Craig D. Bell, Virginia Taxation, 30 U. RIcH. L. REv. 1543, 1547-48 (1996).
60. I.R.C. § 1(gX7) (1994).
61. Davenport, 38 Va. Cir. at 421.
62. See Davenport, 253 Va. at 230, 482 S.E.2d at 809.
63. See id.
64. VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-322 (Repl. Vol. 1997).
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Virginia taxable income."5 A deduction of the children's un-
earned income is not one of the items listed as a possible sub-
traction from a taxpayer's federal adjusted gross income in
order to arrive at the taxpayer's Virginia taxable income. The
Department also argued that on two occasions the Virginia
General Assembly considered, but voted against, amending
section 58.1-322 to specifically provide for an exclusion of a
child's unearned income from the parent's Virginia taxable
income, even if such income was included on the parent's feder-
al income tax return.66
The circuit court noted that the Department's arguments
were compelling and logical; however, they were rejected.67 The
circuit court stated that section 58.1-322(A) provides that:
"'[t]he Virginia taxable income of a resident individual means
his federal adjusted gross income for the taxpayer year...
with the modifications specified in this section.' The trial
court found that, "regardless of where a child's income is re-
ported, it remains the income of the child. It simply is not the
income of the parent."69
The Department made the same arguments on appeal, and
the supreme court reversed the circuit court decision and held
for the Department of Taxation. ° In reaching this result, the
supreme court stated that the plain language of Virginia Code
sections 58.1-301 and 58.1-322 clearly and unambiguously re-
quired the taxpayers to report their federal adjusted gross in-
come as taxable income on the Virginia tax returns.7 The su-
preme court stated that the Davenports elected to include their
children's unearned income in the taxpayer's federal adjusted
gross income for federal taxation purposes and, having made
such election, the taxpayers may not change that election in
computing their state income tax.7 2 The supreme court also
65. Davenport, 38 Va. Cir. at 422.
66. See id. at 423 (citing H.B. 1556, Va. Gen. Assembly, (Reg. Sess. 1991); S.B.
216, Va. Gen. Assembly, (Reg. Sess. 1992)).
67. See id.
68. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-322(AXRepl. Vol. 1997)).
69. Id. at 424.
70. See Virginia Dep't of Taxation v. Davenport, 253 Va. 228, 231, 482 S.E.2d
808, 810 (1997).
71. See id. at 230, 482 S.E.2d at 809.
72. See id. at 230-31, 482 S.E.2d at 809-10.
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noted that the phrase "his federal adjusted gross income" con-
tained in Virginia Code section 58.1-322 did not refer to only
one taxpayer's income, but referred to the amount of federal
adjusted gross income that the taxpayers specified on their
federal income tax return, subject to any modification autho-
rized by Virginia tax statutes.73
B. Recent Significant Legislative Activity
1. Income Tax Credits
a. Major Business Facility Job Tax Credit Amended
In 1997, the General Assembly amended Virginia Code sec-
tion 58.1-439 to clarify current law as to which companies are
eligible to claim the Major Business Facility Job Tax Credit."4
Generally, the Major Business Facility Job Credit, $1,000 per
qualified employee in excess of 100 employed during the year,
is granted to the person who pays taxes for the qualified full-
time employees.75 While a number of technical amendments
were made to section 58.1-439, one of the more significant revi-
sions involves the calculation of the number of qualified full-
time employees at a major business facility, which "includes
employees of a contractor or a subcontractor if such employees
are permanently assigned to the taxpayer's major business
facility."76
The 1997 legislation provides that the credit for any taxpayer
who includes employees of a contractor or subcontractor as
qualified full-time employees during the twenty-four-month
period ending between January 1, 1995 and December 31, 1996
will be limited to $750,000, and can only be claimed for the
establishment of major business facilities in a city with a popu-
lation of more than 170,000, but less than 172,000. 7 The re-
73. See id. at 231, 482 S.E.2d at 810.
74. See VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-439 (Repl. Vol. 1997).
75. See id.
76. Id. § 58.1-439(Q) (Repl. Vol. 1997).
77. See Act of April 2, 1997, ch. 786, 1997 Va. Acts 1915.
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maining revisions to the Major Business Facility Job Tax Credit
were declaratory of existing law. 8
b. Worker Retraining Tax Credit
The 1997 General Assembly created a new income tax credit
to begin with taxable years on or after January 1, 1999, which
encourages employers to retrain their workers. This legislation
creates a new Virginia Code section 58.1-439.6 providing a tax
credit in an amount equal to thirty percent of all expenditures
made by employers for eligible worker retraining for qualified
employees, or up to $100 per qualified employee if the worker
retraining occurs at private schools."9 Qualified worker retrain-
ing consists of noncredit courses at any of the Commonwealth
of Virginia's community colleges, private schools or retraining
programs through apprenticeship agreements approved by the
Virginia Apprenticeship Council.80 The new credit permits a
pass-through of the credit attributable to a partnership, electing
small business corporation, or limited liability company to the
individual partners, shareholders or members, respectively, of
such entities in proportion to their ownership or interest in
such business entities.8' The legislation also permits a carry
forward of any credit not used during the taxable year for the
next three taxable years. "No credit shall be carried back to
a preceding taxable year" and "Itihe amount of credit allowed
shall not exceed the tax imposed for such taxable year."' The
legislation also contains a prioritization of tax credits when an
employer is subject to the tax limitation imposed by the legisla-
tion, but is allowed other tax credits pursuant to other sections
of the Virginia State Tax Code."
78. See id.
79. See VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-439.6(B) (Repl. Vol. 1997).
80. See id. § 58.1-439.6(A) (Repl. Vol. 1997).
81. See id. § 58.1-439.6(C) (Repl. Vol. 1997).
82. See id. § 58.1-439.6(E) (Repl. Vol. 1997).
83. Id.
84. See id.
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2. Gains on the Sale of Certain Government Obligations
Excluded from Virginia Taxable Income
Virginia Code sections 58.1-322 and 58.1-402 were amended
by the 1997 General Assembly to exclude from the Virginia
corporate and individual income tax the gains on the sale of
federal obligations and obligations issued by Virginia and its
localities.' Prior to this legislation, only interest or dividends
on certain federal obligations and obligations issued by Virginia
and its localities were excluded from Virginia taxable income.
This legislation broadens the exemption to include gains real-
ized from the sale or exchange of such obligations.
3. Enterprise Zone Program Expanded
In a continuation of what amounts to an annual revamping
or restructuring of the Virginia Enterprise Zone Program, the
1997 General Assembly passed a number of changes which
have the cumulative effect of expanding the program. The
amount of the general business credit and the real property
investment tax credit components of the Enterprise Zone Pro-
gram that a taxpayer may take will now depend on whether
the taxpayer is considered small or large. A "large qualified
business firm" is a "qualified business firm making qualified
zone investments in excess of $25 million ... result[ing] in the
creation of at least 100 permanent full-time positions."' A
"small qualified business firm" is any qualified business firm
that is not a large qualified business firm. 7
The credit for small qualified business firms remains at
eighty percent of the tax due for the first year, and sixty per-
cent of the tax due for the second through tenth tax years.'
The credit allowable to a large qualified business firm will be
determined by agreement with the Department of Taxation, but
the credit may not exceed the percentage allowed for small firms.'
85. See id. §§ 58.1-322(CX1), (2), -02(CX1), (2) (Repl. Vol. 1997).
86. VA. CODE ANN. § 59.1-280(A) (Cum. Supp. 1997).
87. See id.
88. See id. § 59.1-280(C) (Cum. Supp. 1997).
89. See id. § 59.1-280(D) (Cum. Supp. 1997).
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The General Assembly also made a number of revisions to
the component of the Enterprise Zone Program which involves
the real property investment tax credit. First, availability of the
real property investment tax credit will now depend upon
whether the qualified zone resident is a small qualified zone
resident or a large qualified zone resident. A "large qualified
zone resident" is a "qualified zone resident making qualified
zone investments in excess of $100 million ... [which] result in
the creation of at least 200 permanent full-time positions."" A
"small qualified zone resident" is any qualified zone resident
that is not a large qualified zone resident. 1 Small qualified
zone residents remain entitled to a real property investment tax
credit equal to thirty percent of their qualified zone improve-
ments. 2 Large qualified zone residents are allowed a real
property investment tax credit in an amount of up to five per-
cent of their qualified zone investments in lieu of the real prop-
erty improvement credit. 3 The percentage amount of this cred-
it, up to the five percent maximum, is to be determined by
agreement between the Tax Department and the large qualified
zone resident. 4
The 1997 General Assembly also created an apportionment
formula which has the effect of permitting the general business
credit to be taken only against taxable income attributable to
the conduct of business within the enterprise zone. The legisla-
tion provides for apportionment of the credit for any firm that
has taxable income from business activity conducted "within
and without the enterprise zone."95
To determine the amount of Virginia income apportioned
within the zone, a qualified business firm must multiply its
Virginia taxable income by the fraction resulting from adding
the enterprise zone property factor and enterprise zone payroll
factor and dividing the sum by two.' The property factor "is a
fraction [in which t]he numerator is the average value of real
90. Id. § 59.1-280.1(A) (Cure. Supp. 1997).
91. See id.
92. See id. § 59.1-280.1(C) (Cure. Supp. 1997).
93. See id. § 59.1-280.1(D) (Cum. Supp. 1997).
94. See id.
95. Id. § 59.1-280(G) (Cum. Supp. 1997).
96. See id. § 59.1-280(G)(1) (Cur. Supp. 1997).
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and tangible personal property of the ... firm... used in the
enterprise zone [and t]he denominator is the average value of
real and tangible personal property... used everywhere in
[Virginia]." The payroll factor is a fraction in which the nu-
merator is the total compensation paid or accrued by the firm
during the taxable period in the enterprise zone, and the de-
nominator is the total compensation paid or accrued everywhere
in Virginia for the same period." The legislation also permits
qualified business firms that believe the apportionment formula
operates to apportion to an enterprise zone a smaller portion of
Virginia taxable income than is reasonably attributable to the
business conducted in the zone, to apply to the Department of
Taxation to use an alternative method9
The 1997 General Assembly also made a number of other
important changes to the Enterprise Zone Program. The defini-
tion of a "qualified business firm" was amended to reduce from
forty percent to twenty-five percent the threshold percentage of
low-income or zone resident employees that must be employed
by a business in an enterprise zone for that business to be
eligible for the general business credit."
For purposes of the real property investment tax credit and
enterprise zone grants creating permanent full-time positions,
the definition of permanent full-time position has been amended
to include employees working a minimum of 1680 hours a year
who receive standard fringe benefits paid by the business for
the employee.10'
The legislation also brought within the confidentiality and
secrecy provisions of the State Tax Code all tax information
provided to the Department of Housing and Community Devel-
opment from the Department of Taxation to facilitate the ad-
ministration of the Enterprise Zone Act. 2 Any disclosures or
other improper dissemination of information, except in accor-
97. Id. § 59.1-280(GX1Xa) (Cum. Supp. 1997).
98. See id. § 59.1-280(GX1Xb) (Cum. Supp. 1997).
99. See id. § 59.1-280(GX3) (Cum. Supp. 1997).
100. See id. § 59.1-279(AX1) (Cum. Supp. 1997).
101. See id. §§ 59.1-280.1(A) and 59.1-282.1(A) (Cum. Supp. 1997).
102. See VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-3(C) (Repl. Vol. 1997).
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dance with a proper judicial order or otherwise provided by law,
are now subject to criminal sanctions. °3
In separate legislation, the 1997 General Assembly expanded
the ability of any locality to define a single enterprise zone to
consist of two non-contiguous zone areas. These two non-contig-
uous zone areas will not be considered separate zones for pur-
poses of calculating the maximum number of zone designations
established under the Enterprise Zone Act.' In essence, the
legislation increases the statutory authority to create sub-zones
for all localities. Previously, only rural enterprise zones could
have non-contiguous zone areas.
The legislation also permits a locality or localities who apply
for designation as an enterprise zone to propose adoption of a
local enterprise zone development taxation program "to use tax
increments to encourage private investment in local enterprise
zones.""5 The governing body of any county, city or town can
adopt this program by passing an ordinance designating an
enterprise zone in its boundaries as a local enterprise zone, or
can designate an area as a local enterprise zone contingent on
the locality's designation as an enterprise zone."° The govern-
ing body must "hold a public hearing on the need for a local
enterprise zone development taxation program" before adopting
the ordinance. °7 The ordinance must provide that all or a
specified percentage of the real estate taxes, machinery and tool
taxes, or both, in the local enterprise zone are treated as fol-
lows: (1) "[r]eal estate taxes or machinery and tool taxes at-
tributable to the lower of the current assessed value or base
assessed value of real estate or machinery and tools located in
a local enterprise zone"' °8 will be allocated in the normal
manner, as they would absent the ordinance; and (2) "all or the
specified percentage of the increase in real estate taxes or
machinery and tools taxes, or both, attributable to the differ-
ence between (i) the current assessed value of [the] property
and (ii) the base assessed value of [the] property" are allocated
103. See VA. CODE ANN. § 59.1-282.4 (Cum. Supp. 1997).
104. See id. § 59.1-274(B) (Cum. Supp. 1997).
105. VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-3245.7 (Repl. Vol. 1997).
106. See id. § 58.1-3245.8(A) (Repl. Vol. 1997).
107. Id. § 58.1-3245.8(B) (Repl. Vol. 1997).
108. Id. § 58.1-3245.8(A)(2) (Repl. Vol. 1997).
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into a local development fund that can be spent for specified
purposes."°'
The legislation defines "base assessed value" as the assessed
value on January 1 of the year before the effective date of the
ordinance establishing the local enterprise zone development
taxation program."0
II. RETAIL SALES AND USE TAXES
A. Recent Judicial Decision
In Boehringer Ingelheim Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Department
of Taxation". the Richmond Circuit Court held that
Boehringer Ingelheim's distribution of free drug samples to
Virginia licensed physicians was a taxable use not covered by
the prescription drug and medicine exemption from the Virginia
Retail Sales and Use Tax Act."
Boehringer Ingelheim manufactures pharmaceutical products,
including prescription and over-the-counter medications.
Boehringer Ingelheim regularly packaged some of its prescrip-
tion medicines in smaller containers, labeled Professional Sam-
ples, while the rest of the production batch was packaged in
larger quantities for distribution to pharmacies, hospitals and
other approved recipients."' Boehringer Ingelheim provided
prescription drug and medicine samples to selected employees,
referred to as Detail Persons."' The Detail Persons visited
with Virginia doctors informing them about products being
manufactured by Boehringer Ingelheim, and upon the written
request and signature of the doctor, the Detail Persons provided
samples of the medications to the doctors." 5 The doctors could
then "distribute the samples to their patients when prescribing
that medication."" 6 Following a sales and use tax audit by
109. Id. § 58.1-3245.8(AX3) (Repl. Vol. 1997).
110. See id. § 58.1-3245.6 (Repl. Vol. 1997).
111. 40 Va. Cir. 541 (Richmond City 1996).
112. See id. at 541.
113. See id.
114. See id. at 542.
115. See id.
116. Id
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the Department of Taxation, Boehringer Ingelheim received and
paid two use tax assessments.'
At trial, Boehringer Ingelheim argued that its free distribu-
tion of prescription drug samples by its Detail Persons and the
distribution by the doctors was exempt from Virginia use taxes
pursuant to the prescription drug and medicine exemption."
The Department of Taxation contended, however, that "the
manufacturer's distribution of samples to physicians [was] a
taxable use not covered by the exemption.""9 The circuit court
held that the plain meaning of the statutory exemption lan-
guage did not apply to the free distribution of drug samples by
Detail Persons to authorized recipients. The court noted that
no taxable event occurs when a licensed individual (in this
case, the physician) distributes prescription medication to
patients. The Department has honored this statute in not
imposing a tax on a physician or the patient for that dis-
tribution. However, this statute does not deal with the
distribution from the manufacturer to the physician. Rather,
it deals with medicines distributed by the physicians and
medicines sold by a pharmacy on the order of a physician.
Neither event occurred here. As such, the use involved was
not exempt from taxation.'2
Boehringer Ingelheim was successful with the second aspect
of its lawsuit which concerned the "cost price" upon which the
use tax rate would be applied to determine the appropriate
amount of use tax owed to the Commonwealth. Boehringer
Ingelheim provided "full absorption" method of accounting fig-
ures to the Department of Taxation.' These figures were in-
ternal management accounting data and did not coincide with
"cost price" definition required under Virginia Code section
58.1-602." This provision defines "cost price" as "the actual
117. See id.
118. VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-609.7(1) (Cum. Supp. 1995) and its predecessor VA.
CODE ANN. § 58.1-608(AX7)(a) (Cum. Supp. 1989), were applicable during the audit
time period. The 1996 session of the General Assembly amended section 58.1-609.7(1)
to specifically exempt prescription drugs from the sales and use tax. See Act of April
1, 1996, ch. 479, 1996 Va. Acts 809.
119. Boehringer Ingelheim, 40 Va. Cir. at 543.
120. Id. at 544.
121. See id. at 544-45.
122. See id.
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cost of an item or article of tangible personal property comput-
ed in the same manner as the sales price as defined in this
section without any deductions therefrom on account of the cost
of materials used, labor, or service costs, transportation charg-
es, or any expenses whatsoever."" The circuit court held that
the Department of Taxation could not use Boehringer
Ingelheim's "full absorption" cost figures, which included a
number of items beyond those identified in the definition in
Virginia Code section 58.1-602 of cost price.' The circuit
court ordered the Department of Taxation to recalculate the
taxes based on the definition of cost price in Virginia Code
section 58.1-602.12
B. Recent Significant Legislative Activity
1. Exemptions
a. Broadcasting Exemption Expanded
The 1997 General Assembly expanded the current exemption
for broadcasting equipment to include (1) land based wireless
cable television systems, and (2) open video systems provided
by telephone common carriers.' The legislation also repealed
the exemption which was available to video dial tone sys-
tems.w
Prior to the 1997 legislation, the broadcasting exemption
applied to broadcasting equipment used by commercial radio
and television companies in amplification, transmission and
distribution equipment in towers used or to be used by cable
television systems or video dial tone systems. The 1997 legisla-
tion expanded the exemption to any land based wired or wire-
less cable television systems and includes, for example, televi-
sion programming provided through microwave transmis-
sions.' This type of system is available through common car-
123. Id. at 545 (quoting VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-602 (Repl. Vol. 1997)).
124. See id.
125. See i.
126. See id. § 58.1-609.6(2) (Repl. Vol. 1997).
127. See id.
128. See id.
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rier telephone companies and utilizes fiber optic technology to
deliver video programming."
b. Non-Prescription Drug Exemption Amended
The 1997 General Assembly amended Virginia Code section
58.1-609.7(15) to specifically include within the sales and use
tax exemption for non-prescription drugs and proprietory medi-
cines, "samples of non-prescription drugs and proprietary medi-
cines distributed free of charge by the manufacturer, including
packaging materials and constituent elements and ingredi-
ents."3 ° This legislation did not change the effective date of
the exemption, which remains July 1, 1998.' The non-pre-
scription drug exemption was originally enacted by the 1990
General Assembly to be effective on July 1, 1992.2' The effec-
tive date has been deferred every two years since 1992 by sub-
sequent sessions of the General Assembly.
c. Non-Profit School Exemption Expanded
The 1997 General Assembly expanded the current sales and
use tax exemption for non-profit public and private colleges and
other institutions of learning (including primary and secondary
schools) to include "food purchased for free distribution at the
facilities of the [non-profit] college or other institution of higher
learning."" Prior to this legislation, it was the policy of the
Department of Taxation that food purchased by the school was
exempt if used or consumed by the school in providing its edu-
cational services. However, food purchased by schools and sub-
sequently served free of charge to faculty, staff or guests of the
school was taxable because the food was used or consumed by
the individuals to whom the food was served and not by the
school. This interpretation had previously been approved by a
1970 opinion of the Attorney General."M
129. See id.
130. Id. § 58.1-609.7(15)(a) (Repl. Vol. 1997).
131. See id.
132. See Act of March 10, 1990, ch. 117, 1990 Va. Acts 194, 199.
133. VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-609.4(2) (Repl. Vol. 1997).
134. 1970 Op. Va. Att'y Gen 291.
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d. Definition of Tax-Exempt Organization Adopted
The 1997 General Assembly created a statutory definition of
the term "tax-exempt organization" for all taxes imposed under
the State Tax Code. The legislation defines a tax-exempt orga-
nization as any organization designated as such in writing by
the Internal Revenue Service."3 5 The legislation is significant
because it provides a uniform definition of tax-exempt organiza-
tions, a concept missing from the non-profitable and charitable
exemptions contained in the Virginia Retail Sales and Use Tax
Act. Whenever the General Assembly amends the non-profit
and charitable exemptions, it must specifically define the type
or classification of tax exempt status an organization received
from the Internal Revenue Service to fit within the statutory
exemptions. The new general definition eliminates this technical
requirement and also allows exempt organizations to amend or
change their tax exempt classification with the Internal Reve-
nue Service without the necessity of going back to the Virginia
legislature to amend their particular sales and use tax exemp-
tion.
PART TWO: TAXES ADMINISTERED BY LOCALITIES
I. REAL PROPERTY TAX
A. Recent Judicial Decision
In Augustine Golf Development Corp. v. Stafford County
Board of Supervisors 8' the Stafford County Circuit Court held
that a county is not required to accept an offer to maintain an
open-space agreement which substantially comports with Virgin-
ia Code section 58.1-3233(3).' The issue presented to the
Stafford County Circuit Court was "whether an owner had a
statutory right to have his real property assessed at 'open
space' value, pursuant to a county ordinance permitting [this
135. See VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-1 (RepI. Vol. 1997).
136. 40 Va. Cir. 308 (Stafford County 1996).
137. See id. at 311.
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designation]." 38 Virginia Code section 58.1-3233(3)(iii) provides
that land appropriately qualified as "open space" land may be
assessed at lesser value by the taxing authority when the land
is "subject to a recorded commitment entered into by the land-
owners with the local governing body.., not to change the use
to a non-qualifying use for the time period stated in a commit-
ment of not less than four years and not more than ten
years."3 9
The landowner, Augustine Golf Development Corporation,
operated a public golf course, clubhouse, and other amenities
consisting of approximately 190 acres in Stafford County, Vir-
ginia."4 In the fall of 1994, Augustine Golf prepared and ten-
dered to Stafford County an "Open-Space Use Agreement,"
which covered the entire 190 acres owned by Augustine and
was to have a term of ten consecutive years.' Stafford Coun-
ty declined to execute the agreement tendered by Augustine
Golf. The County conceded that had Augustine Golf elected to
record a perpetual easement held by Stafford County and devot-
ed to open-space use as authorized by Virginia Code section
58.1-3233(3)(ii), Stafford County would have no discretion and
would be required to accept the easement and grant open space
tax assessment to the parcel." However, Stafford County ar-
gued that when a property owner elects to proceed under Vir-
ginia Code section 58.1-3233(3)(iii), the County "retains the
discretion to accept or decline the proffered agreement."'"
The circuit court reviewed the agreement offered by Augus-
tine Golf and noted that it contained many terms of contractu-
al-type language which suggested mutual agreement and will-
ingness between the parties.'" The court concluded that the
"'open-space use agreement' tendered by Augustine Golf was an
offer to maintain its property as open space for a period of ten
years, if the County was willing to accept that offer and in
consideration thereof grant Augustine Golf open-space tax as-
138. Id. at 308.
139. VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-3233(3)(iii) (Repl. Vol. 1997).
140. See Augustine Golf, 40 Va. Cir. at 309.
141. See id.
142. See id.
143. Id.
144. See id. at 310.
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sessment for that period of time."' The court found that
Stafford County had a choice of accepting or rejecting the offer
made by Augustine Golf and that Stafford County was within
its rights in rejecting the open-space tax assessment offer."
B. Recent Significant Legislative Activity
The 1997 General Assembly created a separate classification
for real property tax for environmental restoration sites."
This legislation authorizes localities, by ordinance, "to exempt
or partially exempt such [real] property from local taxation
annually for a period not in excess of five years."148
An "environmental restoration site" is defined to include "real
estate which contains or did contain environmental contamina-
tion from the release of hazardous substances, hazardous
wastes, solid waste or petroleum, the restoration of which
would abate or prevent pollution to the atmosphere or waters of
the Commonwealth," provided the land is restored as part of a
voluntary remediation effort pursuant to Virginia Code section
10.1-1429.1 and "receives a certificate of continued eligibility
from the Virginia Waste Management Board during each year
which the [restoration site] qualifies for tax treatment" under
this legislation.
4 1
11. BuSINEss, PROFESSIONAL AND OCCUPATIONAL LICENSE TAX
A. Recent Significant Legislative Activity
The 1997 General Assembly amended Virginia Code section
58.1-3984(A) to expand the statute of limitations for taxpayers
appealing license tax assessments to a circuit court to allow
appeals to be made within one year from a final determination
made by the Department of Taxation.5 ° The legislation also
permits local assessing officials to appeal final determinations
145. Id. at 311.
146. See id
147. See VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-3664 (Repl. Vol. 1997).
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. See id. § 58.1-3984(AXiii) (Repl. Vol. 1997).
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to the appropriate circuit court within one year from the date of
the determination. 5' Both taxpayers and local assessing offi-
cials wishing to appeal Department of Taxation determinations
now have the later of (i) three years from the last day of the
year for which an assessment is made, (ii) one year from the
date of the assessment, or (iii) one year from the date of a final
determination made by the Tax Commissioner, in which to file
an appeal.
152
B. BPOL Guidelines Released
In 1996, the Virginia General Assembly enacted a major bill
reforming the local business, professional and occupational
license, BPOL, tax.1" Included within the 1996 legislation was
the creation of "Uniform Ordinance" provisions. 1" The 1996
legislation also required the Department of Taxation to promul-
gate guidelines. 5 On January 1, 1997, the Department of
Taxation released the BPOL Guidelines." Virginia Code sec-
tion 58.1-3701 provides that these guidelines will be subject to
the Administrative Process Act and accorded the weight of a
regulation under Virginia Code section 58.1-205.'
The guidelines are comprehensive in nature. They include
detailed definitions for a number of terms which have tradition-
ally caused ambiguity in the interpretation and administration
of the BPOL tax by localities. The guidelines also provide a
detailed description of the structure of the BPOL tax and dis-
cuss the procedures for appeals by taxpayers of BPOL tax as-
sessments.
Any taxpayer who is assessed with a local BPOL tax as a
result of an audit may appeal that assessment to the State Tax
151. See id. § 58.1-3984(B) (Repl. Vol. 1997).
152. See id. § 58.1-3984(A) (Repl. Vol. 1997).
153. See id. §§ 58.1-3700 to -3735. For a discussion of the 1996 BPOL legislation,
see Craig D. Bell, Virginia Taxation, 30 U. RICH. L. REV. 1543, 1603-08 (1996).
154. See VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-3703.1 (Repl. Vol. 1997).
155. See id. § 58.1-3701 (Repl. Vol. 1997).
156. DEPARTMENT OF TAXATION, COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA GUIDELINES FOR
BUSINESS, PROFESSIONAL AND OCCUPATIONAL LICENSE TAX IMPOSED BY CITY, COuNTY
AND TOWN ORDINANCES (1997) [hereinafter GUIDELINES].
157. See VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-3701 (Repl. Vol. 1997).
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Commissioner, who has the authority to reverse the local as-
sessing officer's determination."
Taxpayers retain their right to file an administrative refund
request under Virginia Code section 58.1-3980.' As a result
of the 1996 legislation, taxpayers are also afforded a special ap-
peal procedure with respect to BPOL taxes and audits only.
Any taxpayer aggrieved by an audit assessment of BPOL taxes
may proceed administratively under Virginia Code section 58.1-
3703.1(A)(5)." 6 This special procedure permits appeal of the
local assessing officer's determination to the Virginia Tax Com-
missioner.16 ' The new BPOL tax appeal procedure is limited
to assessments of tax resulting from an audit."6 "Audit" is de-
fined generally as any examination of the taxpayer's books and
records by the local assessing official."6 As a result, a refusal
of a local assessing officer to make a refund based on an
amended return is probably not appealable because there is no
assessment based on the audit. On the other hand, if the
amended return results in an examination of the taxpayer's
books and records and the assessing officer makes some adjust-
ment resulting in an increase of tax, all issues arising in the
audit may be appealed."6 It is not clear how local assessing
officers will interpret the term "audit" for purposes of triggering
a taxpayer's new appeal rights.
Under the BPOL appeal procedures, any arguments raised
for the first time on appeal to the State Tax Commissioner may
be returned to the local assessing officer for his determina-
tion." The form of the administrative BPOL appeal, both to
the local assessing officer and to the State Tax Commissioner,
is informal. The appeal may be made in a letter that sets forth
all the relevant facts, circumstances, and arguments favoring
the taxpayer's position." The taxpayer must attach a copy of
158. See id. § 58.1-3703.1(A)(5Xc) (Repl Vol. 1997).
159. See id. § 58.1-3980 (Repl. Vol. 1997).
160. Id. § 58.1-3703.1(AX5) (Repl. Vol. 1997).
161. See GUIDELINES § 4.1.
162. See id.
163. See GUIDELINES § 4.4.
164. See id.
165. See GUIDELINES § 4.8.5.
166. See GUIDELINES § 4.4 (defining "Appeal to the Tax Commission" and "Applica-
tion for Review").
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the assessment appealed from, and, on appeal to the State Tax
Commissioner, copies of all materials reviewed by the local
assessing officer and the local assessing officer's determina-
tion.6  A taxpayer generally has ninety days from the date of
the assessment in which to make an application for review to
the local assessing officer," and ninety days after that
officer's final determination in which to appeal to the State Tax
Commissioner. 6 ' Any locality which "loses" an administrative
appeal to the State Tax Commissioner is afforded the right to
apply to the appropriate circuit court for judicial relief in the
same manner as an aggrieved taxpayer.7
The Guidelines also provide procedures and details which
elaborate on the State Tax Commissioner's new authority to
issue rulings interpreting the application of Virginia's BPOL
statutes. 7' The State Tax Commissioner, however, will not
issue rulings that turn solely on the interpretations of a local
ordinance.'72 Examples of issues on which the Tax Commis-
sioner may render advisory opinions include:
" Interpretation of changes made to the BPOL legislation;
* Questions, the answers of which depend upon both state
law and the laws of a locality;
* Situations where two jurisdictions are attempting to tax
the same gross receipts;
n Classifications of businesses under the BPOL enabling
legislation;
- Whether a business qualifies as a manufacturer under
existing court decisions;
m Whether a business qualifies for deductions, exclusions, or
reduced rates of tax contained within the BPOL legislation;
167. See id.
168. See GUIDELINES § 4.7.1.
169. See VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-3703.1(AX5Xa), (c) (Repl. Vol. 1997); GUIDELINES §
4.8.1.
170. See GUIDELINES § 4.10.
171. See GUIDELNES § 2.1.7.
172. See GUIDELINES § 4.12.
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m Situs rules contained within the BPOL enabling legislation;
and
m Whether changes made to a local statute conform with
required changes under recent Virginia law.7 '
The Guidelines state that the Tax Commissioner will likely
decline to render advisory opinions on interpretations of word-
ing contained within individual local BPOL ordinances and on
interpretations questioning the validity of a particular locality's
appeal process. 4
Collection activity by a locality must be suspended upon the
filing by a taxpayer of a timely and complete Application for
Review, a Notice of Intent to Appeal or upon receipt of notice of
the filing of an Appeal to the Virginia Tax Commissioner.Y
Collection activity may commence or resume if the local assess-
ing officer determines that collection will be jeopardized by
delay, a Final Local Determination is issued, a taxpayer's ap-
peal is not timely filed after a prior timely Notice of Appeal
was filed with the Tax Commissioner, a final written determi-
nation is issued by the Tax Commissioner which does not total-
ly abate the local license tax assessment, or the taxpayer with-
draws its appeal with the Tax Commissioner.
Local assessing officers also have the power to issue binding
rulings.'77
173. Id.
174. See id.
175. See GUIDELINES § 4.6
176. See id.
177. See GUIDELINES § 4.11.
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